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content: draft: Add mitigation for compromised build tooling #1251

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Dec 11, 2024
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11 changes: 8 additions & 3 deletions docs/spec/draft/threats.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -866,14 +866,19 @@ libDep, resulting in MyPackage also having the security vulnerability.
process, which alters the build process and injects unintended behavior into the
output artifact.

*Mitigation:* Treat build tooling, including OS images, as any other software
to be verified prior to use (as described in (G)). This will allow the build
platform to detect any modified binaries.

*Example:* MyPackage is a tarball containing an ELF executable, created by
running `/usr/bin/tar` during its build process. An adversary compromises the
`tar` OS package such that `/usr/bin/tar` injects a backdoor into every ELF
executable it writes. The next time MyPackage is built, the build picks up the
vulnerable `tar` package, which injects the backdoor into the resulting
MyPackage artifact.

*Mitigation:* **TODO**
MyPackage artifact. Solution: The build platform verifies the disk image,
or the individual components on the disk image, against the associated
provenance or VSAs prior to running a build. The modified `/usr/bin/tar`
will fail this verification.

</details>

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