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content: Update mitigation section for the Dependency Confusion threat. #1226

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content: Update mitigation section for the Dependency Confusion threat. #1226

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Update mitigation section for the Dependency Confusion threat.
meder Oct 29, 2024
a75a5fe
Make href relative.
meder Oct 29, 2024
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11 changes: 10 additions & 1 deletion docs/spec/draft/threats.md
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Expand Up @@ -775,9 +775,18 @@ The consumer requests a package that it did not intend.
on the victim's internal registry, and wait for a misconfigured victim to fetch
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to be clear, is "fetch" the problem here or the fact that a bespoke tool needs to know that that a build should be failed if a package doesn't match its expected issuer and producer and you have to know ahead of time what's expected.

potentially the mitigation for this is just a redirect to the "verifying-artifacts" file?

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dependency resolution algorithms are tricky already. It's also not great to write tools that only know how to fail the build instead of how to fetch the right deps.

from the public registry instead of the internal one.

**TODO:** fill out the rest of this section
*Mitigation:* The mitigation is for the software producer to build internal
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packages on a SLSA Level 2+ compliant build system and define expectations for
build provenance. Expectations must be verified on installation of the internal
packages. If a misconfigured victim attempts to install attacker's package with
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an internal name but from the public registry, then verification against
expectations will fail.

For more information see [Verifying artifacts](/spec/v1.1/verifying-artifacts)
and [Defender's Perspective: Dependency Confusion and Typosquatting Attacks](/blog/2024/08/dep-confusion-and-typosquatting).

</details>

<details><summary>Typosquatting</summary>

*Threat:* Register a package name that is similar looking to a popular package
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