convert snowflake scheduled rules into streaming rules

panther-labs · Oct 11, 2024 · 43cf8cf · 43cf8cf
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diff --git a/correlation_rules/snowflake_potential_brute_force_success.yml b/correlation_rules/snowflake_potential_brute_force_success.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+AnalysisType: correlation_rule
+RuleID: "Snowflake.PotentialBruteForceSuccess"
+DisplayName: "Snowflake Brute Force Login Success"
+Enabled: true
+Severity: High
+Description: Detecting brute force activity and reporting when a user has incorrectly logged in multiple times and then had a successful login.
+Detection:
+  - Sequence:
+      - ID: Multiple Failed Logins
+        RuleID: Snowflake.Stream.BruteForceByIP
+        MinMatchCount: 5
+      - ID: Successful Login
+        RuleID: Snowflake.Stream.LoginSuccess
+    Transitions:
+      - ID: Multiple Failed Logins FOLLOWED BY Successful Login
+        From: Multiple Failed Logins
+        To: Successful Login
+        WithinTimeFrameMinutes: 30
+        Match:
+          - On: CLIENT_IP
+    Schedule:
+      RateMinutes: 720
+      TimeoutMinutes: 15
+    LookbackWindowMinutes: 1440
+Tests:
+    - Name: Successful Bulk Login
+      ExpectedResult: true
+      RuleOutputs:
+        - ID: Multiple Failed Logins
+          Matches:
+            CLIENT_IP:
+              "1.1.1.1": [0, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 15]
+        - ID: Successful Login
+          Matches:
+            CLIENT_IP:
+              "1.1.1.1": [16]
+    - Name: Successful Login With Single Failure
+      ExpectedResult: false
+      RuleOutputs:
+        - ID: Multiple Failed Logins
+          Matches:
+            CLIENT_IP:
+              "1.1.1.1": [0]
+        - ID: Successful Login
+          Matches:
+            CLIENT_IP:
+              "1.1.1.1": [1]
diff --git a/global_helpers/panther_snowflake_helpers.py b/global_helpers/panther_snowflake_helpers.py
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+""" Global helpers for Snowflake streaming detections. """
+
+
+def query_history_alert_context(event):
+    return {
+        "user": event.get("user_name", "<UNKNOWN USER>"),
+        "role": event.get("role_name", "<UNKNOWN ROLE>"),
+        "source": event.get("p_source_label", "<UNKNOWN SOURCE>"),
+        # Not all queries are run in a warehouse; e.g.: getting worksheet files
+        "warehouse": event.get("WAREHOUSE_NAME", "<NO WAREHOUSE>"),
+    }
diff --git a/global_helpers/panther_snowflake_helpers.yml b/global_helpers/panther_snowflake_helpers.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+AnalysisType: global
+Filename: panther_snowflake_helpers.py
+GlobalID: "panther_snowflake_helpers"
+Description: >
+  Global helpers for Snowflake streaming detections
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_account_admin_assigned.py b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_account_admin_assigned.py
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+def rule(event):
+    if event.get("DELETED_ON"):
+        return False
+    return "admin" in event.get("GRANTEE_NAME", "").lower()
+
+
+def title(event):
+    source_name = event.get("p_source_label", "<UNKNWON SNOWFLAKE SOURCE>")
+    target = event.get("GRANTED_TO", "<UNKNWON TARGET>")
+    actor = event.get("GRANTED_BY", "<UNKNOWN ACTOR>")
+    role = event.get("GRANTEE_NAME", "<UNKNOWN ROLE>")
+    return f"{source_name}: {actor} granted role {role} to {target}"
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_account_admin_assigned.yml b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_account_admin_assigned.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+AnalysisType: rule
+Filename: snowflake_account_admin_assigned.py
+RuleID: "Snowflake.Stream.AccountAdminGranted"
+DisplayName: Snowflake Account Admin Granted
+Enabled: true
+LogTypes:
+  - Snowflake.GrantsToUsers
+Severity: Medium
+Reports:
+  MITRE ATT&CK:
+    - TA0004:T1078
+Description: Detect when account admin is granted.
+Tags:
+  - Snowflake
+  - '[MITRE] Privilege Escalation'
+  - '[MITRE] Valid Accounts'
+Tests:
+  - Name: Admin Role Assigned
+    ExpectedResult: true
+    Log:
+      {
+        "p_event_time": "2024-10-08 11:24:50.682000000",
+        "p_log_type": "Snowflake.GrantsToUsers",
+        "p_source_label": "Snowflake Prod",
+        "CREATED_ON": "2024-10-08 11:24:50.682000000",
+        "GRANTED_BY": "SNOWFLAKE",
+        "GRANTED_TO": "APPLICATION_ROLE",
+        "GRANTEE_NAME": "TRUST_CENTER_ADMIN"
+      }
+  - Name: Non-Admin Role Assigned
+    ExpectedResult: false
+    Log:
+      {
+        "p_event_time": "2024-10-08 11:24:50.682000000",
+        "p_log_type": "Snowflake.GrantsToUsers",
+        "p_source_label": "Snowflake Prod",
+        "CREATED_ON": "2024-10-08 11:24:50.682000000",
+        "GRANTED_BY": "SNOWFLAKE",
+        "GRANTED_TO": "APPLICATION_ROLE",
+        "GRANTEE_NAME": "TRUST_CENTER_VIEWER"
+      }
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_ip.py b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_ip.py
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+def rule(event):
+    # Return true for any login attempt; Let Panther's dedup and threshold handle the brute force
+    #   detection.
+    return event.get("EVENT_TYPE") == "LOGIN" and event.get("IS_SUCCESS") == "NO"
+
+
+def title(event):
+    return (
+        "Login attempts from IP "
+        f"{event.get('CLIENT_IP', '<UNKNOWN IP>')} "
+        "have exceeded the failed logins threshold"
+    )
+
+
+def dedup(event):
+    return event.get("CLIENT_IP", "<UNKNOWN IP>") + event.get(
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE", "<UNKNOWN CLIENT TYPE>"
+    )
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_ip.yml b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_ip.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+AnalysisType: rule
+Filename: snowflake_brute_force_by_ip.py
+RuleID: "Snowflake.Stream.BruteForceByIp"
+DisplayName: Snowflake Brute Force Attacks by IP
+Enabled: true
+LogTypes:
+  - Snowflake.LoginHistory
+Severity: Medium
+Reports:
+  MITRE ATT&CK:
+    - TA0006:T1110
+Description: Detect brute force attacks by monitorign failed logins from the same
+  IP address
+DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
+Threshold: 5
+Tags:
+  - Snowflake
+  - '[MITRE] Credential Access'
+  - '[MITRE] Brute Force'
+Tests:
+  - Name: Successful Login
+    ExpectedResult: false
+    Log:
+      {
+        "p_event_time": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "p_log_type": "Snowflake.LoginHistory",
+        "p_source_label": "Snowflake Prod",
+        "CLIENT_IP": "1.1.1.1",
+        "EVENT_ID": "393754014361778",
+        "EVENT_TIMESTAMP": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "EVENT_TYPE": "LOGIN",
+        "FIRST_AUTHENTICATION_FACTOR": "PASSWORD",
+        "IS_SUCCESS": "YES",
+        "RELATED_EVENT_ID": "0",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE": "OTHER",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_VERSION": "1.11.1",
+        "USER_NAME": "[email protected]"
+      }
+  - Name: Unsuccessful Login
+    ExpectedResult: true
+    Log:
+      {
+        "p_event_time": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "p_log_type": "Snowflake.LoginHistory",
+        "p_source_label": "Snowflake Prod",
+        "CLIENT_IP": "1.2.3.4",
+        "EVENT_ID": "393754014361778",
+        "EVENT_TIMESTAMP": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "EVENT_TYPE": "LOGIN",
+        "FIRST_AUTHENTICATION_FACTOR": "PASSWORD",
+        "IS_SUCCESS": "NO",
+        "RELATED_EVENT_ID": "0",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE": "OTHER",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_VERSION": "1.11.1",
+        "USER_NAME": "[email protected]"
+      }
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_username.py b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_username.py
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+def rule(event):
+    # Return true for any login attempt; Let Panther's dedup and threshold handle the brute force
+    #   detection.
+    return event.get("EVENT_TYPE") == "LOGIN" and event.get("IS_SUCCESS") == "NO"
+
+
+def title(event):
+    return (
+        f"User {event.get('USER_NAME', '<UNKNOWN USER>')} has exceeded the failed logins threshold"
+    )
+
+
+def dedup(event):
+    return event.get("USER_NAME", "<UNKNOWN USER>") + event.get(
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE", "<UNKNOWN CLIENT TYPE>"
+    )
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_username.yml b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_brute_force_by_username.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+AnalysisType: rule
+Filename: snowflake_brute_force_by_username.py
+RuleID: "Snowflake.Stream.BruteForceByUsername"
+DisplayName: Snowflake Brute Force Attacks by User
+Enabled: true
+LogTypes:
+  - Snowflake.LoginHistory
+Severity: Medium
+Reports:
+  MITRE ATT&CK:
+    - TA0006:T1110
+Description: Detect brute force attacks by monitorign failed logins from the same
+  IP address
+DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
+Threshold: 5
+Tags:
+  - Snowflake
+  - '[MITRE] Credential Access'
+  - '[MITRE] Brute Force'
+Tests:
+  - Name: Successful Login
+    ExpectedResult: false
+    Log:
+      {
+        "p_event_time": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "p_log_type": "Snowflake.LoginHistory",
+        "p_source_label": "Snowflake Prod",
+        "CLIENT_IP": "1.1.1.1",
+        "EVENT_ID": "393754014361778",
+        "EVENT_TIMESTAMP": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "EVENT_TYPE": "LOGIN",
+        "FIRST_AUTHENTICATION_FACTOR": "PASSWORD",
+        "IS_SUCCESS": "YES",
+        "RELATED_EVENT_ID": "0",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE": "OTHER",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_VERSION": "1.11.1",
+        "USER_NAME": "[email protected]"
+      }
+  - Name: Unsuccessful Login
+    ExpectedResult: true
+    Log:
+      {
+        "p_event_time": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "p_log_type": "Snowflake.LoginHistory",
+        "p_source_label": "Snowflake Prod",
+        "CLIENT_IP": "1.2.3.4",
+        "EVENT_ID": "393754014361778",
+        "EVENT_TIMESTAMP": "2024-10-08 14:38:46.061000000",
+        "EVENT_TYPE": "LOGIN",
+        "FIRST_AUTHENTICATION_FACTOR": "PASSWORD",
+        "IS_SUCCESS": "NO",
+        "RELATED_EVENT_ID": "0",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE": "OTHER",
+        "REPORTED_CLIENT_VERSION": "1.11.1",
+        "USER_NAME": "[email protected]"
+      }
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_external_shares.py b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_external_shares.py
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# CONFIGURATION REQUIRED
+#   Be sure to add code to exclude any transfers from acounts designed to host data shares. Either
+#   add those account names to the set below, or add a rule filter to exclude events with those
+#   account names.
+DATA_SHARE_HOSTING_ACCOUNTS = {
+    # Add account names here
+}
+
+
+def rule(event):
+    return all(
+        [
+            event.get("ACCOUNT_NAME") not in get_data_share_hosting_accounts(),
+            event.get("SOURCE_CLOUD"),
+            event.get("TARGET_CLOUD"),
+            event.get("BYTES_TRANSFERRED", 0) > 0,
+        ]
+    )
+
+
+def title(event):
+    return (
+        f"{event.get('ORGANIZATION_NAME', '<UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION>')}: "
+        "A data export has been initiated from source cloud "
+        f"{event.get('SOURCE_CLOUD', '<UNKNOWN SOURCE CLOUD>')} "
+        f"in source region {event.get('SOURCE_REGION', '<UNKNOWN SOURCE REGION>')} "
+        f"to target cloud {event.get('TARGET_CLOUD', '<UNKNOWN TARGET CLOUD>')} "
+        f"in target region {event.get('TARGET_REGION', '<UNKNOWN TARGET REGION>')} "
+        f"with transfer type {event.get('TRANSFER_TYPE', '<UNKNOWN TRANSFER TYPE>')} "
+        f"for {event.get('BYTES_TRANSFERRED', '<UNKNOWN VOLUME>')} bytes"
+    )
+
+
+def get_data_share_hosting_accounts():
+    """Getter function. Used so we can mock during unit tests."""
+    return DATA_SHARE_HOSTING_ACCOUNTS
diff --git a/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_external_shares.yml b/rules/snowflake_rules/snowflake_external_shares.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+AnalysisType: rule
+Filename: snowflake_external_shares.py
+RuleID: Snowflake.Stream.ExternalShares
+DisplayName: Snowflake External Data Share
+Enabled: true
+LogTypes:
+  - Snowflake.DataTransferHistory
+Severity: Medium
+Reports:
+  MITRE ATT&CK:
+    - TA0010:T1537
+Description: Detect when an external share has been initiated from one source cloud
+  to another target cloud.
+Runbook: Determine if this occurred as a result of a valid business request.
+Tags:
+  - Configuration Required
+  - Snowflake
+  - '[MITRE] Exfiltration'
+  - '[MITRE] Transfer Data to Cloud Account'
+Tests:
+  - Name: Allowed Share
+    ExpectedResult: false
+    Mocks:
+      - objectName: get_data_share_hosting_accounts
+        returnValue: '{DP_EUROPE}, {DP_ASIA}, {DP_AMERICA}'
+    Log:
+      {
+        "ORGANIZATION_NAME": "DAILY_PLANET",
+        "ACCOUNT_NAME": "DP_EUROPE",
+        "REGION": "US-EAST-2",
+        "SOURCE_CLOUD": "AWS",
+        "SOURCE_REGION": "US-EAST-2",
+        "TARGET_CLOUD": "AWS",
+        "TARGET_REGION": "EU-WEST-1",
+        "BYTES_TRANSFERRED": 61235879,
+        "TRANSFER_TYPE": "COPY"
+      }
+  - Name: Disallowed Share
+    ExpectedResult: true
+    Mocks:
+      - objectName: get_data_share_hosting_accounts
+        returnValue: '{DP_EUROPE}, {DP_ASIA}, {DP_AMERICA}'
+    Log:
+      {
+        "ORGANIZATION_NAME": "LEXCORP",
+        "ACCOUNT_NAME": "LEX_SECRET_ACCOUNT",
+        "REGION": "US-EAST-2",
+        "SOURCE_CLOUD": "AWS",
+        "SOURCE_REGION": "US-EAST-2",
+        "TARGET_CLOUD": "AWS",
+        "TARGET_REGION": "EU-WEST-1",
+        "BYTES_TRANSFERRED": 61235879,
+        "TRANSFER_TYPE": "COPY"
+      }