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Hold fees #843
Hold fees #843
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@@ -786,6 +786,14 @@ A fulfilling node: | |
transaction, AND is past this fulfillment deadline: | ||
- MUST fail the channel. | ||
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### Hold fees | ||
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To prevent abuse of the network, nodes will charge a fee for the time that their money is locked up in htlcs. The general direction of this fee stream is backwards. Every node along the route that receives an htlc will pay a time-dependent hold fee rate to its predecessor when the htlc resolves, regardless of whether the htlc was fulfilled or failed. The hold fee rate increases with every hop downstream, because more and more money gets locked up. An intermediary or final node that holds on to the htlc for an unreasonably long period of time will need to pay for that (indirectly) to every node upstream. | ||
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Forwarding an htlc will always add some delay. To prevent senders from collecting 'free' hold fees, routing nodes will demand a discount on the hold fee. If the routing node forwards swiftly, this discount will turn the hold fee negative and require the sender to pay. Ultimately the sum of all these discounts is paid by the original sender of the payment. This is a protection against spam. | ||
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Hold fees only exist in the off-chain domain and don't materialize for pending htlcs on the commitment transaction when a channel is force-closed. There is no way to negotiate the correct hold fee based on the actual hold time when the commitment goes to chain. The assumption is that this is acceptable because the chain fees for the commitment and 2nd level transactions act as an anti-DoS measure already. | ||
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### Adding an HTLC: `update_add_htlc` | ||
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Either node can send `update_add_htlc` to offer an HTLC to the other, | ||
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@@ -805,6 +813,8 @@ is destined, is described in [BOLT #4](04-onion-routing.md). | |
* [`sha256`:`payment_hash`] | ||
* [`u32`:`cltv_expiry`] | ||
* [`1366*byte`:`onion_routing_packet`] | ||
* [`u64`:`hold_fee_rate_day`] | ||
* [`u64`:`hold_fee_discount`] | ||
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#### Requirements | ||
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@@ -829,6 +839,8 @@ A sending node: | |
its commitment transaction, it cannot pay the fee for the updated local or | ||
remote transaction at the current `feerate_per_kw` while maintaining its | ||
channel reserve. | ||
- SHOULD NOT offer a combination of `amount_msat`, `cltv_expiry`, `hold_fee_rate_day` and `hold_fee_discount` such that the remote node cannot pay the hold fee for the longest possible hold duration. The longest possible hold duration is the `cltv_expiry` delta in blocks multiplied by ten minutes. This must also take into account all currently outstanding htlcs. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. See the above comment. It seems strange to do this artificial conversion between wall clock time and block time when we already have There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Yes, agreed that this causes friction for the calculation of the max hold fee. |
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- SHOULD NOT offer a `hold_fee_discount` that it cannot pay for. This must also take into account all currently outstanding htlcs. | ||
- MUST offer `amount_msat` greater than 0. | ||
- MUST NOT offer `amount_msat` below the receiving node's `htlc_minimum_msat` | ||
- MUST set `cltv_expiry` less than 500000000. | ||
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@@ -916,6 +928,7 @@ To supply the preimage: | |
* [`channel_id`:`channel_id`] | ||
* [`u64`:`id`] | ||
* [`32*byte`:`payment_preimage`] | ||
* [`u64:hold fee`] | ||
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For a timed out or route-failed HTLC: | ||
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@@ -925,6 +938,7 @@ For a timed out or route-failed HTLC: | |
* [`u64`:`id`] | ||
* [`u16`:`len`] | ||
* [`len*byte`:`reason`] | ||
* [`u64:hold fee`] | ||
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The `reason` field is an opaque encrypted blob for the benefit of the | ||
original HTLC initiator, as defined in [BOLT #4](04-onion-routing.md); | ||
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@@ -940,6 +954,7 @@ For an unparsable HTLC: | |
* [`u64`:`id`] | ||
* [`sha256`:`sha256_of_onion`] | ||
* [`u16`:`failure_code`] | ||
* [`u64:hold fee`] | ||
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#### Requirements | ||
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@@ -950,6 +965,7 @@ A node: | |
commitment transactions: | ||
- MUST NOT send an `update_fulfill_htlc`, `update_fail_htlc`, or | ||
`update_fail_malformed_htlc`. | ||
- MUST set `hold_fee` to the hold fees that it owes the sending node. Let `hold_duration_days` be the actual time that the htlc was held, expressed in days. This value is calculated as `hold_fee_rate_day` (from `update_add_htlc`) * `hold_duration_days` - `hold_fee_discount` (also from `update_add_htlc`). Example: `hold_fee_rate_day`=200, `hold_fee_discount`=3, `hold_duration_days`=0.02 (30 minutes). Then `hold_fee` is 200 * 0.02 - 3 = 1 sat. `hold_fee` can be negative in which case the sending node owes the receiving node. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. in the case of minutes it is easy to compute the There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Indeed, either way there must be a grace period. For regular lightning payments, there is a similar grace delta added by the sender to accommodate for blocks that are produced while the payment is in flight. A per-block rate doesn't have the granularity of a per-time rate, but perhaps that isn't a problem. To combat spam, the minimum hold fee that the sender needs to pay to each node must be sufficiently high. Charging for a second of hold time is probably not enough, if it is even possible to express in msat. |
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A receiving node: | ||
- if the `id` does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction: | ||
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@@ -967,6 +983,8 @@ A receiving node: | |
- MUST return an error in the `update_fail_htlc` sent to the link which | ||
originally sent the HTLC, using the `failure_code` given and setting the | ||
data to `sha256_of_onion`. | ||
- MUST fail the channel if `hold_fee` is more than 1% below the expected value. This tolerance exists to accommodate for clock skew. | ||
- MUST account for the `hold_fee` internally by adding the value to its balance and subtracting the value from the remote balance. | ||
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#### Rationale | ||
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@@ -263,6 +263,10 @@ It is formatted according to the Type-Length-Value format defined in [BOLT #1](0 | |
2. data: | ||
* [`32*byte`:`payment_secret`] | ||
* [`tu64`:`total_msat`] | ||
1. type: 10 (`hold_fee`) | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Doesn't that conflict with onion messages in #759 There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. This PR is only conceptual at this stage. |
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2. data: | ||
* [`u64`:`hold_fee_rate_day`] | ||
* [`u64`:`hold_fee_discount`] | ||
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### Requirements | ||
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@@ -271,16 +275,19 @@ The writer: | |
- MUST use the legacy payload format instead. | ||
- For every node: | ||
- MUST include `amt_to_forward` and `outgoing_cltv_value`. | ||
- MUST include `hold_fee` | ||
- For every non-final node: | ||
- MUST include `short_channel_id` | ||
- MUST NOT include `payment_data` | ||
- MUST set `hold_fee_rate_day` so that difference between incoming and outgoing `hold_fee_rate_day` for the receiving node is at least the expected value based on the receiving node's channel policy. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I do not understand this sentence and thus not the requirement. Is that related to There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. A node is paying a hold fee to the next node and receiving a hold fee from its predecessor. The idea of this sentence is to point out that a node must make sure that the difference between fees paid and fees received covers the hold fee that they require for themselves. Similar to forwarding a lightning payment where nodes must make sure that the difference between incoming and outgoing amount is at least their desired routing fee. |
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- MUST set `hold_fee_discount` to the amount that the reading node would owe its predecessor if the htlc would remain locked for `hold_grace_period_sec` (as advertised by the reading node), plus all amounts owed by nodes further downstream to their predecessors if they'd all hold the htlc for their `hold_grace_period_sec`. | ||
- For the final node: | ||
- MUST NOT include `short_channel_id` | ||
- if the recipient provided `payment_secret`: | ||
- MUST include `payment_data` | ||
- MUST set `payment_secret` to the one provided | ||
- MUST set `total_msat` to the total amount it will send | ||
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- MUST set `hold_fee_discount` to the amount that the reading node would owe its predecessor if the htlc would remain locked for `hold_grace_period_sec` (as advertised by the reading node). | ||
The reader: | ||
- MUST return an error if `amt_to_forward` or `outgoing_cltv_value` are not present. | ||
- if it is the final node: | ||
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why not per block?
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I've chosen time because it matches the actual cost of locked funds closely. Blocks probably works just as well though.