Add Wallet.sign_deterministic, deterministic nonces

Cargo.toml

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ ergo-merkle-tree = { version = "^0.15.0", path = "./ergo-merkle-tree" }
 ergo-rest = { version = "^0.13.0", path = "./ergo-rest" }
 ergo-lib = { version = "^0.28.0", path = "./ergo-lib"}
 k256 = { version = "0.13.1", features = ["arithmetic", "ecdsa"] }
-elliptic-curve = { version = "0.12", features = ["ff"] }
+elliptic-curve = { version = "0.13", features = ["ff"] }
 thiserror = "1"
 bounded-vec = { version = "^0.7.0" }
 bitvec = { version = "1.0.1" }

ergo-lib/src/wallet.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 pub mod box_selector;
 pub mod derivation_path;
+mod deterministic;
 pub mod ext_pub_key;
 pub mod ext_secret_key;
 pub mod miner_fee;
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ use signing::{sign_transaction, TxSigningError};
 use thiserror::Error;
 
 use crate::chain::ergo_state_context::ErgoStateContext;
+use crate::chain::transaction::reduced::reduce_tx;
 use crate::chain::transaction::reduced::ReducedTransaction;
 use crate::chain::transaction::unsigned::UnsignedTransaction;
 use crate::chain::transaction::Input;
@@ -146,6 +148,46 @@ impl Wallet {
         Ok(tx_hints)
     }
 
+    /// Generate commitments for P2PK inputs using deterministic nonces. \
+    /// See: [`Wallet::sign_transaction_deterministic`]
+    pub fn generate_deterministic_commitments(
+        &self,
+        reduced_tx: &ReducedTransaction,
+        aux_rand: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<TransactionHintsBag, TxSigningError> {
+        let mut tx_hints = TransactionHintsBag::empty();
+        let msg = reduced_tx.unsigned_tx.bytes_to_sign()?;
+        for (index, input) in reduced_tx.reduced_inputs().iter().enumerate() {
+            if let Some(bag) = self::deterministic::generate_commitments_for(
+                &*self.prover,
+                &input.sigma_prop,
+                &msg,
+                aux_rand,
+            ) {
+                tx_hints.add_hints_for_input(index, bag)
+            };
+        }
+        Ok(tx_hints)
+    }
+
+    /// Generate signatures for P2PK inputs deterministically
+    ///
+    /// Schnorr signatures need an unpredictable nonce added to the signature to avoid private key leakage. Normally this is generated using 32 bytes of entropy, but on platforms where that
+    /// is not available, `sign_transaction_deterministic` can be used to generate the nonce using a hash of the private key and message. \
+    /// Additionally `aux_rand` can be optionally supplied with up 32 bytes of entropy.
+    /// # Limitations
+    /// Only inputs that reduce to a single public key can be signed. Thus proveDhTuple, n-of-n and t-of-n signatures can not be produced using this method
+    pub fn sign_transaction_deterministic(
+        &self,
+        tx_context: TransactionContext<UnsignedTransaction>,
+        state_context: &ErgoStateContext,
+        aux_rand: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Transaction, WalletError> {
+        let reduced_tx = reduce_tx(tx_context, state_context)?;
+        let hints = self.generate_deterministic_commitments(&reduced_tx, aux_rand)?;
+        self.sign_reduced_transaction(reduced_tx, Some(&hints))
+    }
+
     /// Signs a message
     pub fn sign_message(
         &self,

ergotree-interpreter/src/sigma_protocol/dlog_protocol.rs

@@ -44,13 +44,18 @@ pub mod interactive_prover {
     use crate::sigma_protocol::crypto_utils;
     use crate::sigma_protocol::wscalar::Wscalar;
     use crate::sigma_protocol::{private_input::DlogProverInput, Challenge};
+    use blake2::Blake2b;
+    use blake2::Digest;
+    use elliptic_curve::ops::MulByGenerator;
     use ergo_chain_types::{
         ec_point::{exponentiate, generator, inverse},
         EcPoint,
     };
+    use ergotree_ir::serialization::SigmaSerializable;
     use ergotree_ir::sigma_protocol::dlog_group;
     use ergotree_ir::sigma_protocol::sigma_boolean::ProveDlog;
-    use k256::Scalar;
+    use k256::elliptic_curve::ops::Reduce;
+    use k256::{ProjectivePoint, Scalar};
 
     /// Step 5 from <https://ergoplatform.org/docs/ErgoScript.pdf>
     /// For every leaf marked “simulated”, use the simulator of the sigma protocol for that leaf
@@ -85,6 +90,49 @@ pub mod interactive_prover {
         (r.into(), FirstDlogProverMessage { a: a.into() })
     }
 
+    /// Step 6 from <https://ergoplatform.org/docs/ErgoScript.pdf>
+    /// Generate first message "nonce" deterministically, optionally using auxilliary rng
+    /// # Safety
+    /// This is only intended to be used in single-signer scenarios.
+    /// Using this in multi-signature situations where other (untrusted) signers influence the signature can cause private key leakage by producing multiple signatures for the same message with the same nonce
+    pub fn first_message_deterministic(
+        sk: &DlogProverInput,
+        msg: &[u8],
+        aux_rand: &[u8],
+    ) -> (Wscalar, FirstDlogProverMessage) {
+        // This is based on BIP340 deterministic nonces, see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki#default-signing
+        type Blake2b256 = Blake2b<blake2::digest::typenum::U32>;
+        const AUX_TAG: &[u8] = b"erg/aux";
+        // Perform domain seperation so alternative signature schemes don't end up producing the same nonce, for example ProveDHTuple with deterministic nonces
+        const NONCE_TAG: &[u8] = b"ergprovedlog/nonce";
+
+        let aux_rand_hash: [u8; 32] = Blake2b256::new()
+            .chain_update(AUX_TAG)
+            .chain_update(aux_rand)
+            .finalize()
+            .into();
+        let mut sk_bytes = sk.w.as_scalar_ref().to_bytes();
+        sk_bytes
+            .iter_mut()
+            .zip(aux_rand_hash)
+            .for_each(|(a, b)| *a ^= b);
+        #[allow(clippy::unwrap_used)] // unwrap will only fail if OOM
+        let hash = Blake2b256::new()
+            .chain_update(NONCE_TAG)
+            .chain_update(sk_bytes)
+            .chain_update(sk.public_image().h.sigma_serialize_bytes().unwrap())
+            .chain_update(msg)
+            .finalize();
+
+        let r = <Scalar as Reduce<k256::U256>>::reduce_bytes(&hash);
+        (
+            r.into(),
+            FirstDlogProverMessage {
+                a: Box::new(ProjectivePoint::mul_by_generator(&r).into()),
+            },
+        )
+    }
+
     /// Step 9 part 2 from <https://ergoplatform.org/docs/ErgoScript.pdf>
     /// compute its response "z" according to the second prover step(step 5 in whitepaper)
     /// of the sigma protocol given the randomness "r"(rnd) used for the commitment "a",
@@ -105,7 +153,7 @@ pub mod interactive_prover {
     /// The function computes initial prover's commitment to randomness
     /// ("a" message of the sigma-protocol) based on the verifier's challenge ("e")
     /// and prover's response ("z")
-    ///  
+    ///
     /// g^z = a*h^e => a = g^z/h^e
     pub fn compute_commitment(
         proposition: &ProveDlog,
@@ -129,20 +177,35 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use crate::sigma_protocol::private_input::DlogProverInput;
 
+    use fiat_shamir::fiat_shamir_hash_fn;
+    use proptest::collection::vec;
     use proptest::prelude::*;
 
     proptest! {
 
         #![proptest_config(ProptestConfig::with_cases(16))]
 
         #[test]
-        #[cfg(feature = "arbitrary")]
         fn test_compute_commitment(secret in any::<DlogProverInput>(), challenge in any::<Challenge>()) {
             let pk = secret.public_image();
             let (r, commitment) = interactive_prover::first_message();
             let second_message = interactive_prover::second_message(&secret, r, &challenge);
             let a = interactive_prover::compute_commitment(&pk, &challenge, &second_message);
             prop_assert_eq!(a, *commitment.a);
         }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn test_deterministic_commitment(secret in any::<DlogProverInput>(), secret2 in any::<DlogProverInput>(), message in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..100000)) {
+            fn sign(secret: &DlogProverInput, message: &[u8]) -> EcPoint {
+                let pk = secret.public_image();
+                let challenge: Challenge = fiat_shamir_hash_fn(message).into();
+                let (r, _) = interactive_prover::first_message_deterministic(secret, message, &[]);
+                let second_message = interactive_prover::second_message(secret, r, &challenge);
+                interactive_prover::compute_commitment(&pk, &challenge, &second_message)
+            }
+            let a = sign(&secret, &message);
+            let a2 = sign(&secret2, &message);
+            prop_assert_ne!(a, a2);
+        }
     }
 }