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ASA-2024-0012, ASA-2024-0013: CosmosSDK: Transaction decoding may result in a stack overflow or resource exhaustion

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Dec 16, 2024 in cosmos/cosmos-sdk • Updated Dec 16, 2024

Package

gomod github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk (Go)

Affected versions

>= 0.50.0-alpha.0, < 0.50.11
< 0.47.15

Patched versions

0.50.11
0.47.15

Description

Summary

ASA-2024-0012

Name: ASA-2024-0012, Transaction decoding may result in a stack overflow
Component: Cosmos SDK
Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per ACMv1.2)
Affected versions: cosmos-sdk versions <= v0.50.10, <= v0.47.14
Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators, node operators

ASA-2024-0013

Name: ASA-2024-0013: CosmosSDK: Transaction decoding may result in resource exhaustion
Component: Cosmos SDK
Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per ACMv1.2)
Affected versions: cosmos-sdk versions <= v0.50.10, <= v0.47.14
Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators, node operators

Impact

ASA-2024-0012

When decoding a maliciously formed packet with a deeply-nested structure, it may be possible for a stack overflow to occur and result in a network halt. This was addressed by adding a recursion limit while decoding the packet.

ASA-2024-0013

Nested messages in a transaction can consume exponential cpu and memory on UnpackAny calls. Themax_tx_bytes sets a limit for external TX but is not applied for internal messages emitted by wasm contracts or a malicious validator block. This may result in a node crashing due to resource exhaustion. This was addressed by adding additional validation to prevent this condition.

Patches

The issues above are resolved in Cosmos SDK versions v0.47.15 or v0.50.11.
Please upgrade ASAP.

Timeline for ASA-2024-0012

  • October 1, 2024, 12:29pm UTC: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program
  • October 1, 2024, 2:47pm UTC: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team
  • December 9, 2024, 11:13am UTC: Core team completes patch for issue
  • Dec 14, 2024,16:00 UTC: Pre-notification delivered
  • Dec 16, 2024, 16:00 UTC: Patch made available

This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on October 1, 2024.

Timeline for ASA-2024-0013

  • October 19, 2024, 8:12pm UTC: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program
  • October 19, 2024, 8:28pm UTC: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team
  • December 11, 2024, 3:31pm UTC: Core team completes patch for issue
  • Dec 14, 2024, 16:00 UTC: Pre-notification delivered
  • Dec 16, 2024, 16:00 UTC: Patch made available

This issue was reported by LonelySloth to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on October 19, 2024.

If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.

If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [email protected]. For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.

References

@julienrbrt julienrbrt published to cosmos/cosmos-sdk Dec 16, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Dec 16, 2024
Reviewed Dec 16, 2024
Last updated Dec 16, 2024

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Weaknesses

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-8wcc-m6j2-qxvm

Source code

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