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I'm requesting a TAG review for allowing SameSite=None cookies in first-party sandboxed contexts in browsers with third-party cookie (3PC) restrictions.
In order to prevent malicious attacks from untrusted content, servers can include a Content-Security-Policy: sandbox HTTP header or sandbox attribute on an embedded iframe. This policy results in the browser treating the frame as an opaque origin, and requests originating from it cannot include SameSite=Strict/Lax cookies. However, for the purposes of 3PC blocking, the opaque origin also causes the browser to treat same-site subresource embeds on the top-level as cross-site, so SameSite=None cookies are also excluded from requests.
To preserve legacy behavior and mitigate future breakage due to 3PC blocking, we would like to introduce a method for servers to indicate to the browser that they wish a sandboxed context to include first-party SameSite=None cookies in requests using a Content-Security-Policy or HTML iframe sandboxing value: 'allow-same-site-none-cookies'.
aamuley
changed the title
Allowing SameSite=None Cookies in Sandboxed Contexts
Early Design Review: Allowing First-Party SameSite=None Cookies in Sandboxed Contexts
Oct 16, 2024
こんにちは TAG-さん!
I'm requesting a TAG review for allowing
SameSite=None
cookies in first-party sandboxed contexts in browsers with third-party cookie (3PC) restrictions.In order to prevent malicious attacks from untrusted content, servers can include a
Content-Security-Policy: sandbox
HTTP header or sandbox attribute on an embedded iframe. This policy results in the browser treating the frame as an opaque origin, and requests originating from it cannot includeSameSite=Strict/Lax
cookies. However, for the purposes of 3PC blocking, the opaque origin also causes the browser to treat same-site subresource embeds on the top-level as cross-site, soSameSite=None
cookies are also excluded from requests.To preserve legacy behavior and mitigate future breakage due to 3PC blocking, we would like to introduce a method for servers to indicate to the browser that they wish a sandboxed context to include first-party
SameSite=None
cookies in requests using aContent-Security-Policy
or HTMLiframe
sandboxing value:'allow-same-site-none-cookies'
.https://github.com/explainers-by-googlers/csp-sandbox-allow-same-site-none-cookies/blob/main/README.md
Further details:
Web Application Security WG
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