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Merge branch 'develop' into threat-318/standard-signin-from-rogue-state
2 parents dea4fb4 + 0cdcbce commit 40eba4b

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AnalysisType: saved_query
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QueryName: "Okta Username Above 52 Characters Security Advisory"
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Description: >
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On October 30, 2024, a vulnerability was internally identified in generating the cache key for AD/LDAP DelAuth. The Bcrypt algorithm was used to generate the cache key where we hash a combined string of userId + username + password. Under a specific set of conditions, listed below, this could allow users to authenticate by providing the username with the stored cache key of a previous successful authentication.
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Customers meeting the pre-conditions should investigate their Okta System Log for unexpected authentications from usernames greater than 52 characters between the period of July 23rd, 2024 to October 30th, 2024.
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https://trust.okta.com/security-advisories/okta-ad-ldap-delegated-authentication-username/
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Query: |
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SELECT
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p_event_time as p_timeline,
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*
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FROM
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panther_logs.public.okta_systemlog
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WHERE
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p_occurs_between('2024-07-22 00:00:00Z','2024-11-01 00:00:00Z')
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AND actor:type = 'User'
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AND eventType = 'user.session.start'
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AND outcome:result = 'SUCCESS'
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AND LEN(actor:alternateId) >= 52
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ORDER by p_event_time ASC NULLS LAST
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LIMIT 100

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