You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
When opening a trove, a user pays an upfront fee equal to the average interest for 7 days. The interest rate can be as low as 0.5%, thus the upfront fee can be as low as 0.5%/52 = 0.0096%. The interest rate calculation also takes the interest of the newly opened Trove into account. Hence, a large trove can have a significant impact on the average interest rate and by extension the upfront fee of opening the trove.
A user could be incentivized to inflate the BOLD supply using a flashloan, since the redemption fee depends on the percentage of the BOLD supply being redeemed.
This can be particularly profitable when large amounts of BOLD are getting redeemed. For example, when a user attempts to redeem 50'000 BOLD of a total supply of 1 million BOLD, they would pay a fee of 5% of the redeemed amount. If the supply is doubled to 2 million BOLD, the fee would be halved to 2.5%.
Assuming that the average interest rate is 1% after the big trove is opened, this behavior is profitable:
0.05 * 50000 < 0.025 * 50000 + 1e9 * 0.01/52
Note that the flashloan can be taken out from the smallest branch to have a larger impact on the average interest rate in that branch, which will make the upfront fee cheaper. If the user wants to avoid self-redemption, they can add the minted BOLD to the stability pool to reduce the percentage of redemptions that are routed through that branch.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
When opening a trove, a user pays an upfront fee equal to the average interest for 7 days. The interest rate can be as low as 0.5%, thus the upfront fee can be as low as 0.5%/52 = 0.0096%. The interest rate calculation also takes the interest of the newly opened Trove into account. Hence, a large trove can have a significant impact on the average interest rate and by extension the upfront fee of opening the trove.
A user could be incentivized to inflate the BOLD supply using a flashloan, since the redemption fee depends on the percentage of the BOLD supply being redeemed.
This can be particularly profitable when large amounts of BOLD are getting redeemed. For example, when a user attempts to redeem 50'000 BOLD of a total supply of 1 million BOLD, they would pay a fee of 5% of the redeemed amount. If the supply is doubled to 2 million BOLD, the fee would be halved to 2.5%.
Assuming that the average interest rate is 1% after the big trove is opened, this behavior is profitable:
Note that the flashloan can be taken out from the smallest branch to have a larger impact on the average interest rate in that branch, which will make the upfront fee cheaper. If the user wants to avoid self-redemption, they can add the minted BOLD to the stability pool to reduce the percentage of redemptions that are routed through that branch.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: