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eviction.h
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eviction.h
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// Copyright (c) 2022 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#ifndef BITCOIN_NODE_EVICTION_H
#define BITCOIN_NODE_EVICTION_H
#include <node/connection_types.h>
#include <net_permissions.h>
#include <chrono>
#include <cstdint>
#include <optional>
#include <vector>
typedef int64_t NodeId;
struct NodeEvictionCandidate {
NodeId id;
std::chrono::seconds m_connected;
std::chrono::microseconds m_min_ping_time;
std::chrono::seconds m_last_block_time;
std::chrono::seconds m_last_tx_time;
bool fRelevantServices;
bool m_relay_txs;
bool fBloomFilter;
uint64_t nKeyedNetGroup;
bool prefer_evict;
bool m_is_local;
Network m_network;
bool m_noban;
ConnectionType m_conn_type;
};
/**
* Select an inbound peer to evict after filtering out (protecting) peers having
* distinct, difficult-to-forge characteristics. The protection logic picks out
* fixed numbers of desirable peers per various criteria, followed by (mostly)
* ratios of desirable or disadvantaged peers. If any eviction candidates
* remain, the selection logic chooses a peer to evict.
*/
[[nodiscard]] std::optional<NodeId> SelectNodeToEvict(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>&& vEvictionCandidates);
/** Protect desirable or disadvantaged inbound peers from eviction by ratio.
*
* This function protects half of the peers which have been connected the
* longest, to replicate the non-eviction implicit behavior and preclude attacks
* that start later.
*
* Half of these protected spots (1/4 of the total) are reserved for the
* following categories of peers, sorted by longest uptime, even if they're not
* longest uptime overall:
*
* - onion peers connected via our tor control service
*
* - localhost peers, as manually configured hidden services not using
* `-bind=addr[:port]=onion` will not be detected as inbound onion connections
*
* - I2P peers
*
* - CJDNS peers
*
* This helps protect these privacy network peers, which tend to be otherwise
* disadvantaged under our eviction criteria for their higher min ping times
* relative to IPv4/IPv6 peers, and favorise the diversity of peer connections.
*/
void ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>& vEvictionCandidates);
#endif // BITCOIN_NODE_EVICTION_H