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+NFC Security Cheat Sheet
+Introduction
+
+Near Field Communication (NFC) enables short-range, wireless communication across a wide set of mobile use cases including tag reading, peer-to-peer transfer, device pairing, access control, and contactless payments.
+This cheat sheet provides practical, high-impact security recommendations for developers implementing NFC features on iOS and Android, covering Reader/Writer, Tag, and Host Card Emulation (HCE/SE) use cases.
+
+Threat Landscape
+
+Common security issues encountered in NFC implementations include:
+
+🎯 Replay and Relay Attacks
+
+No nonce, counter, or TTL enables message duplication.
+
+Relay/“ghost & leech” attacks allow attackers to extend NFC range.
+
+🎯 Eavesdropping
+
+Data sent in the clear can be captured beyond the expected “few cm” range.
+
+Improper RF shielding increases attack distance.
+
+🎯 Cloning & Legacy Cryptography
+
+Use of weak tag types (e.g., MIFARE Classic) enables UID-based cloning.
+
+Legacy crypto (Crypto-1) provides no real protection.
+
+🎯 Malicious NDEF / Deep Link Hijacking
+
+Malicious NDEF payloads can trigger unwanted app experiences.
+
+Attackers can exploit deep links to hijack app intents.
+
+🎯 Downgrade Attacks
+
+Devices may be forced into unauthenticated or legacy modes that bypass protections.
+
+🎯 Parser Bugs & Resource Abuse
+
+Oversized or malformed NDEF/APDU messages can trigger DoS or parsing failures.
+
+🎯 Supply-Chain Abuse
+
+Misconfigured, counterfeit, or cloned tags can be placed in physical locations.
+
+🎯 Payment-Specific Risks
+
+HCE-based Tap-to-Pay requires strict timing, attestation, and PCI/EMV compliance.
+
+General Principles
+
+Always authenticate tags or payloads where integrity matters.
+
+Never trust user-provided NFC data.
+
+Sanitize NDEF payloads before processing.
+
+Use platform APIs instead of custom low-level NFC logic.
+
+Disable NFC features when not required.
+
+Avoid legacy/weak tag types in production systems.
+
+Implement user-visible confirmations when performing sensitive operations.
+
+🔐 Do & Don’t Summary
+Do	Why
+Use strong tag types (Type 4, DESFire EV2/EV3)	Prevent cloning & UID-based attacks
+Use per-transaction nonces/counters	Mitigates replay attacks
+Validate NDEF record types & length	Prevent parser abuse
+Enforce https:// deep links	Prevent malicious app redirection
+Use platform-secure elements when available	Strongest protection for sensitive data
+Use OS attestation (SafetyNet / Play Integrity) for HCE apps	Confirms device integrity
+Don’t	Why Not
+Trust UIDs or tag type alone	Easily cloned/spoofed
+Parse NDEF data without bounds checking	Malicious/oversized records cause DoS
+Assume NFC distance is always "a few cm"	Eavesdropping can exceed 1 meter
+Rely on MIFARE Classic or legacy crypto	Known broken & clonable
+Accept NFC data that triggers deep links directly	Enables hijacking attacks
+Platform Guidance
+🍏 iOS
+
+iOS restricts NFC access through CoreNFC; no background scanning.
+
+iOS only supports NDEF and ISO14443 (Type 4) interactions.
+
+NDEF payloads should be validated using:
+
+Expected record types (.wellKnown, .absoluteURI, .mimeType)
+
+Expected RTD fields
+
+Payload size limits
+
+iOS HCE is not available — payment emulation is handled through Secure Element.
+
+🤖 Android
+
+Supports Reader/Writer, Peer-to-Peer, Tag emulation, and HCE.
+
+Android security best practices:
+
+Use IsoDep with APDU-level authentication.
+
+Do not use NfcA/NfcV raw mode for secure operations.
+
+Validate NDEF entries before processing.
+
+Use FLAG_READER_NFC_A | FLAG_READER_SKIP_NDEF_CHECK carefully—avoid insecure defaults.
+
+Enable foreground dispatch to ensure only your application handles intended intents.
+
+Tag Security Guidelines
+
+✔ Prefer NFC Forum Type 4 or DESFire EV2/EV3.
+✔ Use cryptographic authentication for sensitive use cases.
+✔ Implement application-level MACs for data validation.
+✔ Store only non-sensitive or integrity-protected data on tags.
+✔ Never store secrets or tokens on plain NFC tags.
+
+Host Card Emulation (HCE) Guidance
+
+HCE is powerful but has inherent limitations:
+
+⚠ Risks:
+
+App-based emulation is susceptible to root/jailbreak attacks.
+
+Timing constraints make relay attacks more feasible.
+
+Requires device integrity checks.
+
+✔ Mitigations:
+
+Use Play Integrity API or SafetyNet.
+
+Enforce per-session ephemeral keys.
+
+Validate APDU command size and structure.
+
+Follow EMVCo time windows strictly.
+
+Add server-side transaction validation (nonce, counters, attestation).
+
+Secure Reader/Writer Best Practices
+
+Use per-read session tokens.
+
+Apply NDEF record length limits.
+
+Reject records larger than expected.
+
+Validate MIME types.
+
+Enforce strict URI whitelisting.
+
+Disable peer-to-peer mode unless required.
+
+Explicitly close and reset reader sessions after use.
+
+NDEF Record Validation
+
+Before processing any NFC payload, enforce:
+
+✔ MIME-type checking
+✔ Size limits
+✔ Expected RTD types
+✔ Allowed URI schemes
+✔ Safe parsing (no recursion, no nested excessive records)
+✔ Rejecting unknown/unsupported TNF values
+
+Testing & Hardening
+
+Use the following tools and techniques:
+
+🧪 Tools
+
+ndef-tools
+
+Android Studio NFCTools
+
+proxmark3 (hardware)
+
+Flipper Zero (range/relay test)
+
+EMVCo Level 1 tools (payments)
+
+🛡 Hardening Checklist
+
+ Validate NDEF payloads
+
+ Enforce max message size
+
+ Use strong tag type
+
+ Implement anti-replay (nonce/counters)
+
+ Implement anti-relay if applicable
+
+ Use attestation (HCE apps)
+
+ Whitelist URI schemes
+
+ Sanitize deep links
+
+ Use platform APIs
+
+ Disable unused NFC modes
+
+References
+
+NFC Forum Specifications (NDEF, RTD, LLCP)
+
+EMVCo Contactless Specifications
+
+PCI DSS for mobile/contactless systems
+
+OWASP MASVS / MASTG
+
+Google Android NFC Documentation
+
+Apple CoreNFC Documentation
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