diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fbf2e12 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +name: CI + +on: + pull_request: + push: + branches: [master] + +jobs: + build: + strategy: + fail-fast: false + matrix: + os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest] + runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v2 + - name: Use Node.js + uses: actions/setup-node@v2 + with: + node-version: '16.13.0' + cache: 'yarn' + - name: Install build dependencies + run: sudo apt-get install -y libncurses5 + if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' + - name: Install build dependencies + run: brew install automake libtool + if: matrix.os == 'macos-latest' + - name: Set yarn version + run: yarn set version 1.19.1 + - name: Build packages + run: yarn build \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/android/jni/include/secp256k1.h b/android/jni/include/secp256k1.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc4c5ce --- /dev/null +++ b/android/jni/include/secp256k1.h @@ -0,0 +1,614 @@ +#ifndef _SECP256K1_ +# define _SECP256K1_ + +# ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +# endif + +#include + +/* These rules specify the order of arguments in API calls: + * + * 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined + * output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments. + * 2. Array lengths always immediately the follow the argument whose length + * they describe, even if this violates rule 1. + * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated + * later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, private nonces, + * messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks. + * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less + * complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers, + * counts, flags, booleans. + * 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to. + */ + +/** Opaque data structure that holds context information (precomputed tables etc.). + * + * The purpose of context structures is to cache large precomputed data tables + * that are expensive to construct, and also to maintain the randomization data + * for blinding. + * + * Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction is + * far slower than all other API calls (~100 times slower than an ECDSA + * verification). + * + * A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads + * simultaneously, but API call that take a non-const pointer to a context + * need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for + * secp256k1_context_destroy and secp256k1_context_randomize. + * + * Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case + * you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock. + */ +typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context; + +/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or + * comparison, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[64]; +} secp256k1_pubkey; + +/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature. + * + * The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not + * guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is + * however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved. + * If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or + * comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* functions. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char data[64]; +} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature; + +/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce. + * + * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail. + * Out: nonce32: pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function. + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL) + * key32: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL) + * algo16: pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature + * algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility). + * data: Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through. + * attempt: how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce. + * This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values + * are required to result in a different nonce. + * + * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of + * the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt. + */ +typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)( + unsigned char *nonce32, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *key32, + const unsigned char *algo16, + void *data, + unsigned int attempt +); + +# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ) +# if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__) +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \ + ((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min)) +# else +# define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0 +# endif +# endif + +# if (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || (__STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L) ) +# if SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(2,7) +# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline__ +# elif (defined(_MSC_VER)) +# define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline +# else +# define SECP256K1_INLINE +# endif +# else +# define SECP256K1_INLINE inline +# endif + +#ifndef SECP256K1_API +# if defined(_WIN32) +# ifdef SECP256K1_BUILD +# define SECP256K1_API __declspec(dllexport) +# else +# define SECP256K1_API +# endif +# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) +# define SECP256K1_API __attribute__ ((visibility ("default"))) +# else +# define SECP256K1_API +# endif +#endif + +/**Warning attributes + * NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out + * some paranoid null checks. */ +# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4) +# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__)) +# else +# define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT +# endif +# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4) +# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x) __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x))) +# else +# define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x) +# endif + +/** All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */ +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1) +/** The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */ +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9) +#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8) + +/** Flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create. */ +#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY) +#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN) +#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT) + +/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_privkey_export. */ +#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION) +#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION) + +/** Create a secp256k1 context object. + * + * Returns: a newly created context object. + * In: flags: which parts of the context to initialize. + * + * See also secp256k1_context_randomize. + */ +SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create( + unsigned int flags +) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + +/** Copies a secp256k1 context object. + * + * Returns: a newly created context object. + * Args: ctx: an existing context to copy (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_clone( + const secp256k1_context* ctx +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + +/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object. + * + * The context pointer may not be used afterwards. + * Args: ctx: an existing context to destroy (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy( + secp256k1_context* ctx +); + +/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to + * an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned + * explicitly in the header. + * + * The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a + * specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with + * the case that this code itself is broken. + * + * On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about + * such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable. + * When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not + * to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are + * undefined. + * + * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is + * passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer + * (NULL restores a default handler that calls abort). + * data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above. + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback( + secp256k1_context* ctx, + void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), + const void* data +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check + * fails. The default is crashing. + * + * This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation, + * memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can + * otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere + * incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback + * for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including + * crashing. + * + * Args: ctx: an existing context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: fun: a pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs, + * taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores a default + * handler that calls abort). + * data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above. + */ +SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback( + secp256k1_context* ctx, + void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data), + const void* data +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object. + * + * Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid. + * 0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a + * parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined. + * In: input: pointer to a serialized public key + * inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input + * + * This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or + * 0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header + * byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t inputlen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence. + * + * Returns: 1 always. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object. + * Out: output: a pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if + * compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key + * in. + * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to an integer which is initially set to the + * size of output, and is overwritten with the written + * size. + * In: pubkey: a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an + * initialized public key. + * flags: SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in + * compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *outputlen, + const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey, + unsigned int flags +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format. + * + * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object + * In: input64: a pointer to the 64-byte array to parse + * + * The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a + * 32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the + * encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding. + * + * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or + * S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail validation for any + * message and public key. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, + const unsigned char *input64 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature. + * + * Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sig: a pointer to a signature object + * In: input: a pointer to the signature to be parsed + * inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input + * + * This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the + * encoded numbers are out of range. + * + * After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the + * encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is + * guaranteed to fail for every message and public key. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t inputlen +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format. + * + * Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: output: a pointer to an array to store the DER serialization + * In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer + * should be set to the length of output. After the call + * it will be set to the length of the serialization (even + * if 0 was returned). + * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output, + size_t *outputlen, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format. + * + * Returns: 1 + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: output64: a pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization + * In: sig: a pointer to an initialized signature object + * + * See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *output64, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Verify an ECDSA signature. + * + * Returns: 1: correct signature + * 0: incorrect or unparseable signature + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification. + * In: sig: the signature being verified (cannot be NULL) + * msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (cannot be NULL) + * pubkey: pointer to an initialized public key to verify with (cannot be NULL) + * + * To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S + * form are accepted. + * + * If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this + * rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to + * validation, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures. + * + * For details, see the comments for that function. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form. + * + * Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was. + * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object + * Out: sigout: a pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form, + * or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if + * you're only interested in whether the input was already + * normalized). + * In: sigin: a pointer to a signature to check/normalize (cannot be NULL, + * can be identical to sigout) + * + * With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same + * message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This + * is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping' + * the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature. + * + * Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems + * where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can + * cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers + * to use a normalized form. + * + * The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when + * variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify, + * making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because + * anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this + * property anyway. + * + * The lower S value is always between 0x1 and + * 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0, + * inclusive. + * + * No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but + * there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction, + * is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also + * accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this + * property is required for an application. + * + * The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the + * lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case + * signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property, + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout, + const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function. + * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of + * extra entropy. + */ +SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979; + +/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */ +SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default; + +/** Create an ECDSA signature. + * + * Returns: 1: signature created + * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: sig: pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL) + * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL) + * seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) + * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used + * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL) + * + * The created signature is always in lower-S form. See + * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details. + */ +SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig, + const unsigned char *msg32, + const unsigned char *seckey, + secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, + const void *ndata +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4); + +/** Verify an ECDSA secret key. + * + * Returns: 1: secret key is valid + * 0: secret key is invalid + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Compute the public key for a secret key. + * + * Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores + * 0: secret was invalid, try again + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL) + * Out: pubkey: pointer to the created public key (cannot be NULL) + * In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Negates a private key in place. + * + * Returns: 1 always + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to the public key to be negated (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_negate( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Negates a public key in place. + * + * Returns: 1 always + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to the public key to be negated (cannot be NULL) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2); + +/** Tweak a private key by adding tweak to it. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting private key + * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the + * private key). 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting public key + * would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the + * corresponding private key). 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation + * (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key object. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Tweak a private key by multiplying it by a tweak. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + unsigned char *seckey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value. + * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for + * uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object initialized for validation + * (cannot be NULL). + * In/Out: pubkey: pointer to a public key obkect. + * In: tweak: pointer to a 32-byte tweak. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, + const unsigned char *tweak +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +/** Updates the context randomization to protect against side-channel leakage. + * Returns: 1: randomization successfully updated + * 0: error + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL) + * In: seed32: pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state) + * + * While secp256k1 code is written to be constant-time no matter what secret + * values are, it's possible that a future compiler may output code which isn't, + * and also that the CPU may not emit the same radio frequencies or draw the same + * amount power for all values. + * + * This function provides a seed which is combined into the blinding value: that + * blinding value is added before each multiplication (and removed afterwards) so + * that it does not affect function results, but shields against attacks which + * rely on any input-dependent behaviour. + * + * You should call this after secp256k1_context_create or + * secp256k1_context_clone, and may call this repeatedly afterwards. + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize( + secp256k1_context* ctx, + const unsigned char *seed32 +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1); + +/** Add a number of public keys together. + * Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid. + * 0: the sum of the public keys is not valid. + * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object + * Out: out: pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key + * (cannot be NULL) + * In: ins: pointer to array of pointers to public keys (cannot be NULL) + * n: the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1) + */ +SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine( + const secp256k1_context* ctx, + secp256k1_pubkey *out, + const secp256k1_pubkey * const * ins, + size_t n +) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3); + +# ifdef __cplusplus +} +# endif + +#endif diff --git a/android/src/main/java/co/airbitz/fastcrypto/RNFastCryptoModule.java b/android/src/main/java/co/airbitz/fastcrypto/RNFastCryptoModule.java index 9aed3b7..20b2e2d 100644 --- a/android/src/main/java/co/airbitz/fastcrypto/RNFastCryptoModule.java +++ b/android/src/main/java/co/airbitz/fastcrypto/RNFastCryptoModule.java @@ -13,6 +13,17 @@ public class RNFastCryptoModule extends ReactContextBaseJavaModule { private final ReactApplicationContext reactContext; private final String userAgent; + static { + System.loadLibrary("secp256k1"); + System.loadLibrary("crypto_bridge"); // this loads the library when the class is loaded + } + public native String secp256k1EcPubkeyCreateJNI(String privateKeyHex, int compressed); + + public native String secp256k1EcPrivkeyTweakAddJNI(String privateKeyHex, String tweakHex); + + public native String secp256k1EcPubkeyTweakAddJNI( + String publicKeyHex, String tweakHex, int compressed); + public RNFastCryptoModule(ReactApplicationContext reactContext, String userAgent) { super(reactContext); this.reactContext = reactContext; @@ -39,4 +50,40 @@ public void readSettings(final String directory, final String filePrefix, final task.executeOnExecutor(AsyncTask.THREAD_POOL_EXECUTOR, null); } + @ReactMethod + public void secp256k1EcPubkeyCreate(String privateKeyHex, Boolean compressed, Promise promise) { + int iCompressed = compressed ? 1 : 0; + try { + String reply = + secp256k1EcPubkeyCreateJNI(privateKeyHex, iCompressed); // test response from JNI + promise.resolve(reply); + } catch (Exception e) { + promise.reject("Err", e); + } + } + + @ReactMethod + public void secp256k1EcPrivkeyTweakAdd(String privateKeyHex, String tweakHex, Promise promise) { + try { + String reply = + secp256k1EcPrivkeyTweakAddJNI(privateKeyHex, tweakHex); // test response from JNI + promise.resolve(reply); + } catch (Exception e) { + promise.reject("Err", e); + } + } + + @ReactMethod + public void secp256k1EcPubkeyTweakAdd( + String publicKeyHex, String tweakHex, Boolean compressed, Promise promise) { + int iCompressed = compressed ? 1 : 0; + try { + String reply = + secp256k1EcPubkeyTweakAddJNI( + publicKeyHex, tweakHex, iCompressed); // test response from JNI + promise.resolve(reply); + } catch (Exception e) { + promise.reject("Err", e); + } + } } diff --git a/index.js b/index.js index 9ae03e9..189d46a 100644 --- a/index.js +++ b/index.js @@ -11,4 +11,50 @@ export async function methodByString(method: string, jsonParams: string) { export async function readSettings(dirpath: string, filePrefix: string) { return await RNFastCrypto.readSettings(normalizeFilePath(dirpath), filePrefix); -} \ No newline at end of file +} + +async function publicKeyCreate(privateKey: Uint8Array, compressed: boolean) { + const privateKeyHex = base16.stringify(privateKey) + const publicKeyHex: string = await RNFastCrypto.secp256k1EcPubkeyCreate( + privateKeyHex, + compressed + ) + const outBuf = base16.parse(publicKeyHex, { out: Buffer.allocUnsafe }) + return outBuf +} + +async function privateKeyTweakAdd(privateKey: Uint8Array, tweak: Uint8Array) { + const privateKeyHex = base16.stringify(privateKey) + const tweakHex = base16.stringify(tweak) + const privateKeyTweakedHex: string = + await RNFastCrypto.secp256k1EcPrivkeyTweakAdd(privateKeyHex, tweakHex) + const outBuf = base16.parse(privateKeyTweakedHex, { + out: Buffer.allocUnsafe + }) + return outBuf +} + +async function publicKeyTweakAdd( + publicKey: Uint8Array, + tweak: Uint8Array, + compressed: boolean +) { + const publicKeyHex = base16.stringify(publicKey) + const tweakHex = base16.stringify(tweak) + const publickKeyTweakedHex: string = + await RNFastCrypto.secp256k1EcPubkeyTweakAdd( + publicKeyHex, + tweakHex, + compressed + ) + const outBuf = base16.parse(publickKeyTweakedHex, { + out: Buffer.allocUnsafe + }) + return outBuf +} + +export const secp256k1 = { + publicKeyCreate, + privateKeyTweakAdd, + publicKeyTweakAdd +} diff --git a/ios/RNFastCrypto.m b/ios/RNFastCrypto.m index 425d5cb..2e58e67 100644 --- a/ios/RNFastCrypto.m +++ b/ios/RNFastCrypto.m @@ -170,4 +170,50 @@ + (void) handleDefault:(NSString*) method resolve(r); } + +RCT_REMAP_METHOD(secp256k1EcPubkeyCreate, + secp256k1EcPubkeyCreate:(NSString *)privateKeyHex + compressed:(NSInteger)compressed + resolver:(RCTPromiseResolveBlock)resolve + rejecter:(RCTPromiseRejectBlock)reject) +{ + char *szPublicKeyHex = malloc(sizeof(char) * [privateKeyHex length] * 2); + fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create([privateKeyHex UTF8String], szPublicKeyHex, compressed); + NSString *publicKeyHex = [NSString stringWithUTF8String:szPublicKeyHex]; + free(szPublicKeyHex); + resolve(publicKeyHex); +} + +RCT_REMAP_METHOD(secp256k1EcPrivkeyTweakAdd, + secp256k1EcPrivkeyTweakAdd:(NSString *)privateKeyHex + tweak:(NSString *)tweakHex + resolver:(RCTPromiseResolveBlock)resolve + rejecter:(RCTPromiseRejectBlock)reject) +{ + int privateKeyHexLen = [privateKeyHex length] + 1; + char szPrivateKeyHex[privateKeyHexLen]; + const char *szPrivateKeyHexConst = [privateKeyHex UTF8String]; + + strcpy(szPrivateKeyHex, szPrivateKeyHexConst); + fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(szPrivateKeyHex, [tweakHex UTF8String]); + NSString *privateKeyTweakedHex = [NSString stringWithUTF8String:szPrivateKeyHex]; + resolve(privateKeyTweakedHex); +} + +RCT_REMAP_METHOD(secp256k1EcPubkeyTweakAdd, + secp256k1EcPubkeyTweakAdd:(NSString *)publicKeyHex + tweak:(NSString *)tweakHex + compressed:(NSInteger) compressed + resolver:(RCTPromiseResolveBlock)resolve + rejecter:(RCTPromiseRejectBlock)reject) +{ + int publicKeyHexLen = [publicKeyHex length] + 1; + char szPublicKeyHex[publicKeyHexLen]; + const char *szPublicKeyHexConst = [publicKeyHex UTF8String]; + + strcpy(szPublicKeyHex, szPublicKeyHexConst); + fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(szPublicKeyHex, [tweakHex UTF8String], compressed); + NSString *publicKeyTweakedHex = [NSString stringWithUTF8String:szPublicKeyHex]; + resolve(publicKeyTweakedHex); +} @end diff --git a/ios/secp256k1.xcframework/Info.plist b/ios/secp256k1.xcframework/Info.plist new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8978814 --- /dev/null +++ b/ios/secp256k1.xcframework/Info.plist @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ + + + + + AvailableLibraries + + + LibraryIdentifier + ios-arm64_armv7_armv7s + LibraryPath + libsecp256k1.a + SupportedArchitectures + + arm64 + armv7 + armv7s + + SupportedPlatform + ios + + + LibraryIdentifier + ios-arm64_i386_x86_64-simulator + LibraryPath + libsecp256k1.a + SupportedArchitectures + + arm64 + i386 + x86_64 + + SupportedPlatform + ios + SupportedPlatformVariant + simulator + + + CFBundlePackageType + XFWK + XCFrameworkFormatVersion + 1.0 + + diff --git a/native-libs/Makefile b/native-libs/Makefile index b09f6c3..98c09ec 100644 --- a/native-libs/Makefile +++ b/native-libs/Makefile @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ LIBS := -lmymonerocorecpp \ -lboost_thread \ -lboost_system \ -lboost_regex \ + -lsecp256k1 \ -lm # Do not use -lpthread on Android: diff --git a/native-libs/deps/recipes/boost/boost.recipe b/native-libs/deps/recipes/boost/boost.recipe index 874714c..1af5901 100644 --- a/native-libs/deps/recipes/boost/boost.recipe +++ b/native-libs/deps/recipes/boost/boost.recipe @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ build_bjam() { build() { LIBRARIES=--with-libraries=system,thread,regex + WITH_BJAM= cd boost_$version @@ -53,14 +54,19 @@ build() { fi cp $recipe_dir/user-config.jam tools/build/src/user-config.jam - build_bjam + B2=b2 + if [ Darwin = $(uname -s) ]; then + build_bjam + B2=bjam + WITH_BJAM=--with-bjam=bjam + fi echo Bootstrapping boost... - ./bootstrap.sh --prefix=$install_dir --with-bjam=bjam $LIBRARIES + ./bootstrap.sh --prefix=$install_dir $WITH_BJAM $LIBRARIES echo Building boost... export NO_BZIP2=1 - ./bjam -q -d+2 toolset=gcc-env link=static threading=multi install + ./$B2 -q -d+2 toolset=gcc-env link=static threading=multi install } include="include/boost/*" diff --git a/native-libs/deps/recipes/jni-bridge/CMakeLists.txt b/native-libs/deps/recipes/jni-bridge/CMakeLists.txt index f8691f2..12ce66e 100644 --- a/native-libs/deps/recipes/jni-bridge/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/native-libs/deps/recipes/jni-bridge/CMakeLists.txt @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.4.1) +include_directories(${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/../../../../android/jni/include) + add_library(crypto_bridge SHARED crypto_bridge.cpp) diff --git a/native-libs/deps/recipes/libsecp256k1/libsecp256k1.recipe b/native-libs/deps/recipes/libsecp256k1/libsecp256k1.recipe new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0006164 --- /dev/null +++ b/native-libs/deps/recipes/libsecp256k1/libsecp256k1.recipe @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +inherit lib + +source="https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1.git#21ffe4b22a9683cf24ae0763359e401d1284cc7a" + +build() { + export ZERO_AR_DATE=1 + + # Build: + autoreconf -i + ./configure --host=$cross --prefix=$install_dir \ + --disable-tests --with-bignum=no --with-field=32bit + make clean + make + make install +} + +include="include/secp256k1.h" +lib="lib/libsecp256k1.a" diff --git a/native-libs/deps/recipes/nativecrypto/nativecrypto.recipe b/native-libs/deps/recipes/nativecrypto/nativecrypto.recipe index 78d8ed5..1f8a899 100644 --- a/native-libs/deps/recipes/nativecrypto/nativecrypto.recipe +++ b/native-libs/deps/recipes/nativecrypto/nativecrypto.recipe @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -depends="mymonerocorecpp" +depends="mymonerocorecpp libsecp256k1" inherit lib build() { diff --git a/native-libs/deps/recipes/ndk/ndk.recipe b/native-libs/deps/recipes/ndk/ndk.recipe index 6457e07..670f6ce 100644 --- a/native-libs/deps/recipes/ndk/ndk.recipe +++ b/native-libs/deps/recipes/ndk/ndk.recipe @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ task unzip-ndk download setup() { echo Unpacking toolchain... cd android-ndk-$version - python build/tools/make_standalone_toolchain.py --verbose --arch $1 --api 21 --stl libc++ --force --install-dir $work_dir/$1 + python3 build/tools/make_standalone_toolchain.py --verbose --arch $1 --api 21 --stl libc++ --force --install-dir $work_dir/$1 echo Patching headers... cat $recipe_dir/langinfo.h >> $work_dir/$1/sysroot/usr/local/include/langinfo.h diff --git a/native-libs/jni-bridge/crypto_bridge.cpp b/native-libs/jni-bridge/crypto_bridge.cpp index 6d86f9d..e445c48 100644 --- a/native-libs/jni-bridge/crypto_bridge.cpp +++ b/native-libs/jni-bridge/crypto_bridge.cpp @@ -106,4 +106,93 @@ Java_co_airbitz_fastcrypto_MoneroAsyncTask_moneroCoreJNI(JNIEnv *env, jobject th return out; } +JNIEXPORT jstring JNICALL +Java_co_airbitz_fastcrypto_RNFastCryptoModule_secp256k1EcPubkeyCreateJNI(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, + jstring jsPrivateKeyHex, jint jiCompressed) { + char *szPrivateKeyHex = (char *) 0; + szPrivateKeyHex = 0; + if (jsPrivateKeyHex) { + szPrivateKeyHex = (char *) env->GetStringUTFChars(jsPrivateKeyHex, 0); + if (!szPrivateKeyHex) { + return env->NewStringUTF("Invalid private key error!"); + } + } + int privateKeyLen = strlen(szPrivateKeyHex); + + char szPublicKeyHex[privateKeyLen * 2]; + + fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(szPrivateKeyHex, szPublicKeyHex, jiCompressed); + jstring out = env->NewStringUTF(szPublicKeyHex); + env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(jsPrivateKeyHex, szPrivateKeyHex); + + return out; +} + +JNIEXPORT jstring JNICALL +Java_co_airbitz_fastcrypto_RNFastCryptoModule_secp256k1EcPrivkeyTweakAddJNI(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, + jstring jsPrivateKeyHex, + jstring jsTweakHex) { + char *szPrivateKeyHexTemp = (char *) 0; + char *szTweakHex = (char *) 0; + + if (jsPrivateKeyHex) { + szPrivateKeyHexTemp = (char *) env->GetStringUTFChars(jsPrivateKeyHex, 0); + if (!szPrivateKeyHexTemp) { + return env->NewStringUTF("Invalid private key error!"); + } + } + + int privateKeyLen = strlen(szPrivateKeyHexTemp); + char szPrivateKeyHex[privateKeyLen + 1]; + strcpy(szPrivateKeyHex, (const char *) szPrivateKeyHexTemp); + + if (jsTweakHex) { + szTweakHex = (char *) env->GetStringUTFChars(jsTweakHex, 0); + if (!szTweakHex) { + env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(jsPrivateKeyHex, szPrivateKeyHexTemp); + return env->NewStringUTF("Invalid tweak error!"); + } + } + + fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(szPrivateKeyHex, szTweakHex); + jstring out = env->NewStringUTF(szPrivateKeyHex); + env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(jsPrivateKeyHex, szPrivateKeyHexTemp); + env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(jsTweakHex, szTweakHex); + return out; +} + +JNIEXPORT jstring JNICALL +Java_co_airbitz_fastcrypto_RNFastCryptoModule_secp256k1EcPubkeyTweakAddJNI(JNIEnv *env, jobject thiz, + jstring jsPublicKeyHex, + jstring jsTweakHex, + jint jiCompressed) { + char *szPublicKeyHexTemp = (char *) 0; + char *szTweakHex = (char *) 0; + + if (jsPublicKeyHex) { + szPublicKeyHexTemp = (char *) env->GetStringUTFChars(jsPublicKeyHex, 0); + if (!szPublicKeyHexTemp) { + return env->NewStringUTF("Invalid private key error!"); + } + } + + int publicKeyLen = strlen(szPublicKeyHexTemp); + char szPublicKeyHex[publicKeyLen + 1]; + strcpy(szPublicKeyHex, (const char *) szPublicKeyHexTemp); + + if (jsTweakHex) { + szTweakHex = (char *) env->GetStringUTFChars(jsTweakHex, 0); + if (!szTweakHex) { + env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(jsPublicKeyHex, szPublicKeyHexTemp); + return env->NewStringUTF("Invalid tweak error!"); + } + } + + fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(szPublicKeyHex, szTweakHex, jiCompressed); + jstring out = env->NewStringUTF(szPublicKeyHex); + env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(jsPublicKeyHex, szPublicKeyHexTemp); + env->ReleaseStringUTFChars(jsTweakHex, szTweakHex); + return out; +} + } diff --git a/native-libs/src/native-crypto.cpp b/native-libs/src/native-crypto.cpp index 270f205..bc17365 100644 --- a/native-libs/src/native-crypto.cpp +++ b/native-libs/src/native-crypto.cpp @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ */ #include "native-crypto.h" +#include #include #include #include @@ -13,6 +14,10 @@ #include #include +#define COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH 33 +#define DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH 65 +#define PRIVKEY_LENGTH 64 + const char *create_blocks_request(int height, size_t *length) { return serial_bridge::create_blocks_request(height, length); } @@ -113,3 +118,150 @@ void fast_crypto_monero_core(const char *szMethod, const char *szJsonParams, cha memcpy(*pszResult, result.c_str(), result.length() + 1); } + + +void bytesToHex(uint8_t * in, int inlen, char * out) +{ + uint8_t * pin = in; + const char * hex = "0123456789abcdef"; + char * pout = out; + for(; pin < in+inlen; pout +=2, pin++){ + pout[0] = hex[(*pin>>4) & 0xF]; + pout[1] = hex[ *pin & 0xF]; + } + pout[0] = 0; +} + +bool hexToBytes(const char * string, uint8_t *outBytes) { + uint8_t *data = outBytes; + + if(string == NULL) + return false; + + size_t slength = strlen(string); + if(slength % 2 != 0) // must be even + return false; + + size_t dlength = slength / 2; + + memset(data, 0, dlength); + + size_t index = 0; + while (index < slength) { + char c = string[index]; + int value = 0; + if(c >= '0' && c <= '9') + value = (c - '0'); + else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') + value = (10 + (c - 'A')); + else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') + value = (10 + (c - 'a')); + else + return false; + + data[(index/2)] += value << (((index + 1) % 2) * 4); + + index++; + } + + return true; +} + +secp256k1_context *secp256k1ctx = NULL; + +// Must pass a privateKey of length 64 bytes +void fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const char *szPrivateKeyHex, char *szPublicKeyHex, int compressed) +{ + if (secp256k1ctx == NULL) { + secp256k1ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + } + + int flags = compressed ? SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED : SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED; + uint8_t privateKey[PRIVKEY_LENGTH]; + szPublicKeyHex[0] = 0; + + bool success = hexToBytes(szPrivateKeyHex, privateKey); + if (!success) { + return; + } + + secp256k1_pubkey public_key; + if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1ctx, &public_key, privateKey) == 0) { + return; + } + + unsigned char output[DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t output_length = DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH; + secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1ctx, &output[0], &output_length, &public_key, flags); + bytesToHex(output, output_length, szPublicKeyHex); +} + +// secp256k1_pubkey public_key; + +void fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(char *szPrivateKeyHex, const char *szTweak) { + if (secp256k1ctx == NULL) { + secp256k1ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + } + + int privateKeyLen = strlen(szPrivateKeyHex) / 2; + unsigned char privateKey[DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char tweak[DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + + bool success = hexToBytes(szPrivateKeyHex, privateKey); + if (!success) { + return; + } + success = hexToBytes(szTweak, tweak); + if (!success) { + return; + } + if (secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1ctx, privateKey, (unsigned char *) tweak) == 1) { + bytesToHex((uint8_t *)privateKey, privateKeyLen, szPrivateKeyHex); + } +} + +void fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(char *szPublicKeyHex, const char *szTweak, int compressed) { + if (compressed != 1) { + szPublicKeyHex[0] = 0; + return; + } + + if (secp256k1ctx == NULL) { + secp256k1ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); + } + + int flags = compressed ? SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED : SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED; + int publicKeyLen = compressed ? COMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH : DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH; + + unsigned char publicKey[DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char tweak[DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + + bool success = hexToBytes(szPublicKeyHex, publicKey); + if (!success) { + szPublicKeyHex[0] = 0; + return; + } + + success = hexToBytes(szTweak, tweak); + if (!success) { + szPublicKeyHex[0] = 0; + return; + } + + secp256k1_pubkey public_key; + if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(secp256k1ctx, &public_key, publicKey, publicKeyLen) == 0) { + szPublicKeyHex[0] = 0; + return; + } + + if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(secp256k1ctx, &public_key, tweak) == 0) { + szPublicKeyHex[0] = 0; + return; + } + + unsigned char output[DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t output_length = DECOMPRESSED_PUBKEY_LENGTH; + secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1ctx, &output[0], &output_length, &public_key, flags); + bytesToHex((uint8_t *)output, output_length, szPublicKeyHex); +} + diff --git a/native-libs/src/native-crypto.h b/native-libs/src/native-crypto.h index 3055a15..4181fd7 100644 --- a/native-libs/src/native-crypto.h +++ b/native-libs/src/native-crypto.h @@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ void get_transaction_pool_hashes(const char *buffer, size_t length, char **pszRe void fast_crypto_monero_core(const char *szMethod, const char *szJsonParams, char **pszResult); +void fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(char *szPrivateKeyHex, const char *szTweak); +void fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(char *szPublicKeyHex, const char *szTweak, int compressed); +void fast_crypto_secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(const char *szPrivateKeyHex, char *szPublicKeyHex, int compressed); + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/yarn.lock b/yarn.lock new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb57ccd --- /dev/null +++ b/yarn.lock @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +# THIS IS AN AUTOGENERATED FILE. DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE DIRECTLY. +# yarn lockfile v1 + +